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problems of the giant corporation. Unless the instructor can add a great deal
from his own observations concerning every-day practice in civil law courts,
this chapter will hardly convey that message which to this reviewer is perhaps
the most essential one of all comparative law teaching in this country-that
even in the most dictatorial country of the civil-law orbit, the "little man," in
many ways, has had access to judge and justice more readily and more effec-
tively than in this country which has perfected its procedure for commercial
needs while relegating the righting of every day's wrongs to law-less and law-
yer-less small claims courts and the charity of legal aid.25 The young compara-
list, as a future leader of the bar, must gain awareness of this crucial problem.
Schlesinger's book is a brilliant feat. It is as good as any one man's job can
be on a subject which cannot be circumscribed in scope or aim, and for which
the definitive teaching tool could be produced, if at all, only by a concerted
effort of several schools and instructors of necessarily varying backgrounds and
interests. To all schools and instructors in this country as well as abroad, how-
ever, this book will remain indispensable as a work of reference and inspira-
tion.
ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIGj
PARENTAL AUTHORITY: THE COMMUNITY AND THE LAW. By Julius Cohen,
Reginald A. H. Robson, and Alan Bates. New Brunswick: Rutgers Uni-
versity Press, 1958. Pp. xii, 301. $6.00.
Iv the "moral sense of the community" is relevant to the lawmaking proc-
ess, either as a norm for the lawmaker (both legislator and judge) to con-
sider, or as one to follow, its determination need not be left wholly to con-
jecture or intuition. Modem social science techniques are reasonably adequate
to ascertain this moral sense with regard to any given subject-matter that
concerns the lawmaker. On this premise the three authors--one a law-man,
the other two sociologists-base their study. Using legal and community at-
titudes regarding parental control over children as the specific subject-matter
of their research, the authors demonstrate a sociological method for ascertain-
ing community attitudes and norms for purposes of comparison with the
statutes of one state. The jurisdiction is Nebraska, where the authors were
living when they did their study; hence the statutes are those of Nebraska
and the sample of people interviewed is representative of the adults of that
state.
knowledge, are noted with apparent approval. Pp. 225-26, 230. There are occasional, but
perhaps inevitable, over-generalizations which may distort the reader's picture of the
civilian process in general, as with regard to the appeal de novo, p. 229, the "examination
of the parties," p. 219, and the oath, p. 220.
25. On the key problem of attorneys' fees, pp. 206, 350, 355, see Ehrenzweig, Shall
Counsel Fees Be Allowed, 26 C-.s. S.B.J. 107 (1951).
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The concrete questions answered 'by the study are: (1) To what extent is
the law in the selected areas of child-parent relationships in agreement or at
variance with the views of the community? (2) How homogeneous are the
views of the community concerning the law? In other words, is there a moral
sense of the community, or are there nany moral senses? (3) What bearing
do such socio-economic factors as age, income, sex, education, religion have
on the views of people in the community concerning the law? (4) What
reasons are given by those in the community for their views concerning the
law? (5) To what extent do the findings of social science support the judg-
ments of the community concerning the consequences of the adoption or re-
jection of specific legal norms?
The answers to these significant questions are discovered by an interview
technique as rigorous and reliable as is known to social science today. The
findings are of high intrinsic interest and value to both law-men and sociolo-
gists. The demonstration of the method of research-which is the authors'
main purpose--deserves the serious attention of legislators, judges, and stu-
dents. The senior author makes a brilliant philosophic and legal case for the
further use of the method. He anticipates and-in the judgment of the re-
viewer-satisfactorily answers the objections of law-men against the method:
(1) While every case is unique and must be decided on its individual cir-
cumstances, the judge can use a scientifically ascertained "moral sense of the
community," rather than his own intuition, as a base line gauging the devia-
tion of the individual case from the norm. (2) The cost of such a study is
not prohibitive. This one cost only eleven thousand dollars, and the authors
believe the figure could be reduced if future students benefit from their errors.
(3) The questions posed during the interview were not too hypothetical;
rather they were made quite specific.
Three criticisms of the study can 'be raised which the authors do not ade-
quately answer. They did not ascertain the intensity of opinions given in
response to their questions. The authors recognized this problem, but they
believed they did not have sufficient funds to ask the additional questions that
would have resolved the issue. A second objection is that people have definite
opinions about some things, and vague and confused opinions about other
things, and one cannot properly know the "sense of the community" unless
one can distinguish among these. Tautologous answers, given when respond-
ents were asked to cite the reasons for their opinions, might have provided
a clue as to the proportion confused, but the authors did not exploit this pos-
sibility. A third objection is that answers to questions are taken literally,
whereas most opinion research has shown that only relative or comparative
judgments are reliable. The authors' dilemma, of course, was that their pur-
pose required them to ascertain absolute or literal judgments, while there is
no reliable research technique yet known for ascertaining absolute judgments.
It is only fair to add that the authors make superb use of subsidiary questions,




In the space of a short review, it is not possible to present more than a few
of the many substantive conclusions of this study. The law does not value
children as highly as people do, possibly because there is a lag in the law. The
law fails to recognize age differences in deciding on the independence of chil-
dren, but people certainly do. There are very few significant differences among
people with differing socio-economic background-on sex, religion, age, edu-
cation, income, occupation, number of children, urban-rural residence-on at-
titudes as to what should be the extent of parental authority, and most of the
differences that did appear are quite small. No category in the population
(using these eight criteria) were regularly closer to the existing law in their
opinions than any other category. An illustration of the interesting findings
derived from the probing of reasons for given opinions is that the public is less
likely to support parental control over a child's earnings than over gifts to a
child (although a clear majority are in favor of neither), whereas the law
gives parents control of a child's earnings but not his gifts. The reasons for
this community attitude appear to be that gifts might be large, whereas earn-
ings are likely to be small, and people believe that a child should be protected,
for his own future benefit, against squandering sizeable gifts.
Of the seventeen issues on parental authority studied, the public agreed
with the law on only five, disagreed on ten, and was ambiguous on two. Thus,
for this subject matter, the law is generally not in accord with the moral sense
of the community. Three reasons are offered to explain this: "the differences
in the impact of tradition upon law-makers and upon the community; the
relative lack of pressures exerted upon law-makers to signal the need for
change; and the inadequacy of prevailing techniques utilized by law-makers
for ascertaining the moral sense of the community."'
In this otherwise careful, scholarly, thoughtful study there is one bit of in-
completeness which this reviewer may be permitted to point out. The intro-
ductory, and especially the concluding, chapters convey the impression that
the method of ascertaining the moral sense of the community used here-an
opinion survey-is an innovation. But the authors fail to cite an earlier study
by this reviewer 2 which did exactly the same thing (with perhaps a slightly
better technique, although admittedly an inadequate sample). In fact, my
earlier study arrived at a conclusion which is identical with a major one of
this study, although the subject matter of the research was different-name-
ly, that the community may value children more highly than does the law.
Notwithstanding the fact that this study is not wholly novel, it has such a
high degree of intrinsic merit that it deserves the close attention of law-men
and sociologists. For sociologists, the study provides a superb addition to
knowledge concerning the values of a community and the correlations of these
values to socially significant categories of the population. For law-men, the
justification for the study--both in philosophic and practical terms-is best
1. P. 195.
2. Rose & Prell, Does the Punishment Fit the Crine? A Study in Social Valualion,
61 Am- J. SoCIOLOGY 247 (1955).
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made by the senior author in the book's first chapter. I can only provide a
brief summary of his argument, and urge a careful reading of the full book.
Whenever the legislator or judge arrives at a decision as to what is to be
done about a given problem or conflict, he has some conception of the pre-
vailing notions of right and wrong to guide him. Existing statutes and judicial
precedents are usually not specific enough or relevant enough to compel his
decision without reference to additional standards. Assuming that he does not
cynically choose his value-premises arbitrarily, or in terms of his purely per-
sonal interests, he is obliged to think in terms of community values-whether
these be current norms or ideals for the future. At present, he guesses regard-
ing these values. If he is a perceptive and intellectually honest person, his
guesses are probably good ones in so far as he is acquainted with the various
populations that make up the community. But in our heterogeneous society,
no man can be sufficiently familiar with the range of subcultural variations to
be found in an American jurisdiction. To overcome these limitations on ex-
perience, not to speak of any inadequacies in personal sensitivity, the legis-
lator and judge need some systematic means of ascertaining the relevant moral
judgments that are to be found in the community. Empirical social research
can provide such a means. Allusions to the community's moral sense are com-
monplace in legislatures and courts, but seldom, if ever, is there a reasonable
specification given as to how one discovers this. Even if the judge or legis-
lator deems it desirable to ignore the current, perhaps debased, moral sense
of a given segment of the community, he ought to make sure he really knows
what that moral sense is, and not rely on intuition or stereotypes. He can then
reasonably arrive at a decision which will have the best chance of effectuating
his idea of justice.
Cohen does a splendid job of answering the stated and potential objections
of the law-men, and of making a positive case for the research, and, with
minor exceptions, Robson and Bates do a splendid job of executing and pre-
senting a useful example of sociological research.
ARNOLD M. ROSEt
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